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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
)
INSURANCE COMP ANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant.
-vs.-

[
\

Case
No. 11350

CARL R. SESSIONS,
Third-Party Def end ant
and Respondent.

RESP'ONDENT''S BRIEF
S'l1A'lEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff and respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, to
recover from the defendant and appellant, Farmers In~unmee Exchange, the sum of $676.18 under the provi~io11s of a subrogation agreement contained in the State
Parm\; policy with its insured.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER COURT
After the plaintiff's complaint had been filrd, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim against defendant upon which relief could be granted assertiugthat subrogation did not lie> for medical pay. This motion was denied by Judge Wilkins in the Distriet Court
of Salt Lake County. The plaintiff then filed a motion
for summary judgment which was heard by Judge Croft,
and the motion for summary judgment was granted for
the sum of $676.18, interest and costs of court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the trial court's judgment
affirmed.
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court revernr•
the lower court's summary judgment in plaintiff's favor
and to dismiss plaintiff's action on the ground that as a
matter of law, there exists no right of subrogation. In
the alternative appellant has requested the court to remand the case to the trial court to determine the factunl
question of whether defendant had notice of plaintiff's
right of subrogation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Compan)·,
agrees with the statement of facts as set forth by appellant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, except for the fol-
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lo\\·iu~ additional facts which respondent deems impor-

taut in connection with the proper presentation of the
case.

rl1 he Record discloses (R. 5) that Farmers Insurance
K-.:clwnge wrote a letter to State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company elated October 19, 1967, advising State Farm
::IIutual Insurance Company that they were in receipt of
lhr subrogation demand for both medical pay and prop('rty damage and enclosed with the letter a check for
$'727.87 ~which was the demand of State Farm Mutual Inq1rance Company for the automobile damage except for
the deductible, but denying the medical pay subrogaiion claim 011 the basis that subrogation would not lie.

The respondent further alleged in its complaint that
notice had been given (R. 3) of the subrogation interest
of Rtde Farm Mutual Insurance Company and the payment or anticipated payment of the property damage and
tliP medical bills which was admitted by appellant (R 11)
awl Farmers Insurance Exchange further admitted
U1ci payment to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
of th0 property damage subrogation claim and the mailing of a letter dated October 19, 1967, attached to respondent's complaint (R. 5).
Notice of the subrogation claim for the property
damage and medical pay was given and acknowledged
nt the same time and in the same communications (Exl1ihit D-2, R. 5). The insured of State Farm Mutual In-:m·,: tt('C Company was also giYen notice of the subroga-
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tion rights of State Farm Mutual Insurance Companr
and of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company's notir~
to Farmers Insurance Exchange of State Farm Mutirnl
Insurance Company's subrogation rights. (Exhibit p 1
and D-2).
By letter dated February 19, 1968, appellant's coun.
sel in a letter to Judge Wilkins acknowledged they had
received evidence of notice and that it was 110 longer
an issue (R. 54).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NO'r COMMIT ERROR IN RULING THAT A RIGHT OF SUBROGATION EXISTS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANm~
COMP ANY, AND IN GRANTING A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF FOR THE
MEDICAL BILLS rrHE PLAINTIFF PAID ON
BEHALF OF ITS INSURED.
In No. 4 of Vol. 4, of the Utah Law Review, 1955,
there is an article on Assignment of Tort Actions. Thi'
article was written before the Survivorship Statute W8'
enacted in 1967, but it indicates the trend of the Utah
Court prior to that time. 1.Ve quote from that article at
page 549, as follows :
Assignment of tort claims has been the subject of
very little attention on the part of writers a1~d
scholars. There is relatively little case law :n
this country dealing with such assignments. It is
not then very astonishing to learn that Utah haF
but little law on the subject and that the scatten·d
4

cases do not synthesize readily into clear general
rules.
However, some few observations which may
throw light on the fate of future assignments of
tort claims in this state may be made. Foremost
among these is the recognition, both generally and
in Utah, that the arguments against assignment
which seemed overwhelming to the common law
judges have lost most of their persuasive force
today. Maintenance and champerty are no longer dreaded as the termites which will eat out the
foundation of the legal system or flood the courts
·with torrents of ill-founded and unnecessary litigation.
That torts are "personal" to the parties involved
is no longer a weighty idea. The very general
trend toward survivorship of tort claims has
shown convincingly that most tort claims can be
tried between the tort f easor and someone other
than the original plaintiff. Perhaps this is the
foundation of the general norm which determines
·whether a claim is assignable by asking whether
or not it survives. It has been suggested that the
increasing scope of survival statutes will, through
operation of this norm, eventually make tort actions as assignable as contract actions are today.
It is interesting to notice that Utah has identified
with this norm. It is even more interesting to ob~
serve, however, that the Utah court has sustained
certain assignments of tort claims without noting
the existence of survival statutes which were at
least relevant and at most controlling, if that
norm is the only one. It appears to this writer
that the Utah court wisely has not permitted the
Rurviva1 norm to control its thinking. It is often
Raid that actions which survive have been asRigned by operation of law. But it does not fol-

low that ev~ry action w!1ich survives should ip~r;
facto be assignable; assignment and snniYa] ;m
not convertible terms.
It is some advance to he liberated from the 8 nr. '
vival test. It is extremely difficult, howewr, tn
frame another general standard for determinatio11
of assignability. The modern English view that
tort claims which have the character of or are i
akin to property interests are assignable ha8 a .
good deal of appeal, and the Utah court has eridently been influenced by this notion, notably in
the rescission cases discussed above. But the ~lan
gers of a raigid "property" test have been dem.
onstrated in the experience of equity's rule that it
protects only property interests: Such thingR as
news of daily events and membership in social organizations and religious groups have been called
"property" in order to justify obviously nemsary intervention of equity courts.

Probably the most that can presently be said is
that the scope of assignahility is certain to expand further; that the Utah court has been in
the trend of expansion, as shown by the fact that
no Utah case has refused validity to an assigllment of a tort claim, and that none of the Utah
cases have reached a wrong or undesirable rrsult. * * *
Utah now has a survival statute pertaining to personal injuries which was enacted by the 1967 Legislature.
This is Section 78-11-12 which provides as follows:
Causes of action arising out of physical injury to
the person or death, caused by the wrongful ad
or negligence of another shall not abate upon Ow
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person, ' .nd
the injured person or the personal representat1w
or heirs of one meeting death as aboYe stated
6

shall have a cause of action except for claims relating to pain and suffering against the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer; provided, howe1'er, that the injured person or the personal representatives or heirs of one meeting death shall
not recover judgment except upon some competent
satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of
said injured person.
Respondent aclrnowledges a conflict in the authorities in the variom: states on the right of subrogation in
the case of medical bills but takes the position that the
modern trend and the weight of authority, particularly
of the more recent cases, authorizes subrogation for medi('al pay claims.
The question as to an insurer's supbrogation rights
tmder a medical payment subrogation clause in an automobile iusurance policy may arise in a variety of ways:
(1) An insurer who has made medical payments pursuant
to the policy may attempt to recover them directly from
llte tort feasor; (2) An insurer claiming the right to reimbursement may attempt to recover them back from
thr insured after the latter has settled with or recov1·r<'cl n judgment against the tort feasor; ( 3) An insured
may attempt to recover medical payments from an in::ll!'er ·which refuses to pay them unless and until the
i11snred executes a formal agreement subrogating the
insured to the proceeds of any recovery which the in'lll'ed may obtain: ( 4) An insured may bring an action
to rec(1ver medical payments from an insurer which flatly
r 0 fuse~ Lo make them because the insured has already
;r·1tlt>d with and released the tort feasor and has thereby
7

prejudiced the insured 's subrogation right; and ( 5) One
insurer claiming a right to subrogation may attempt to
recover the medic?J payments made to its insured from
the insure·r of the tort f easor after the first insurer has
given the tort feasor's insurer notice of its subrogation
and the tort feasor's insurer thereafter makes settlement
with the insured of the first insurer.
The case before this court comes under the fifth
group of cases set forth above, but the principles announced in all of the cases are applicable to determine
the question as to whether or not subrogation will lie.
In a few cases cited in appellant's brief the court~
obserYing that a claim for personal injuries is not assignable, have held that subrogation of an insurer pursuant
to medical payments provision clause will not be allo\\'cd
where it amounts to an attempted assignment of a claim
for personal injuries. Appellant cited cases in the states
of Missouri and one in Arizona and also one n California. The California case of Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 34 Cal. Rep. 41 (1963) is not applicahh·
because California had a specific statute against assignment at that time.
On the other hand, the courts in several cases aJl(l
several states have recognized the insured 's right to hr
subrogated pursuant to such a policy provision. Respondent will set forth herein cases in the states of
Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, New York.
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Michigan, North Carolina.
Wisconsin and Minnesota which have allowed suhrogll
8

iiou of medical payments. In some of these cases the
courts have based such a holding on the ground that a
claim for personal injuries may properly be assigned.
[11 other cases, however, the courts, although recognizing that a personal injury claim is not assignable, have
hrld that the medical payments subrogation clause in
question did not constitute an assignment of a claim for
p0rsonal injuries, but merely impressed a lien in favor of
the insurer to the extent of its payments. 19 ALR 3rd
1055.
Iu the case of Davenport, et al. v. State Farm Mu-

tual, et al., (1965, Nev.), 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10, State
Fnrrn l\lutual Insurance Company brought an action
against Allstate and their insured to recover the sum
of $1,000.00 paid cut on medical bills under the medical
pay coverage of their policy. The policy of State Farm
Mutual in the Davenport case contains the same subrog·ation provision as the policy in the case now before the
Utah court.
State Farm Mutual had previously put Allstate InHtuance Company, the tort f easor 's carrier, on notice of
tl1e payment and their subrogation rights. Thereafter
Allstate settled with State Farm Mutual's insured for
tl1e snm of $8,000.00. Allstate ignored the subrogation
letters from State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
1'l1c lower court held State Farm Mutual Insurance Compan? was entitled to recover and the Supreme Court of
N('\·nrla affirmed.
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Nevada has a statute, Nevada Revised States, 41-100
which provides for survival of causes of action for personal injury. This statute states that a claim may be
prosecuted as would a cause of action for damages to
personal property no matter whether a plaintiff or defendant died. The Nevada Court said:
It is now quite generally accepted that assigna
bility of the right to sue in tort for personal injuries is governed by the test of survivorship. That
is if the right of action surviYes the death of the
injured person, that right is assignable.

This case is actually on all fours with the case now before the Utah Court.
The Nevada Court stated:
If the $8,000.00 payment was meant to include the
claimant's medical expenses, hvo drafts should
have been issued, one for those expenses payable
to the Handleys and State Farm jointly and the
other for the balance payable to the Handleys
alone. However, our lack of knowledge in this
respect is not significant, for one fact is established. Settlement was made without regard to
the known subrogation or lien right of State
Farm. We hold that, where the medical payment
clause of an automobile insurance policy subrogates the company to the extent of the medi('al
payments made by it to the insured, to the proceeds of any settlement that may result from the
exercise of any rights of recovery 1-vhich the injured person receiving such payment may hare
against any person, the tort f easor or his insurance carrier may not disregard that known snli
rogation or lien right in settling his liability.
10

Ju an action by an insurer against a third party tort
f•_·asor to recover the amount of the medical payments
tlrnt it liacl paid to the insured ''there the plaintiff alleged
tl1nt it was subrog·ated to medical payments made by it
to the iusurecl and that the insured executed a subrogation agreement whereby she assigned the claim against
t]1C' rlcfondant third party tort feasor to plaintiff, the
ronrt in Tracelrrs Insura1Jice Co. v. Lutz (1964, Ohio),
~10 N.E. 2d 755, overruling defendant's demurrer held
that the law of Ohio appeared to be relatively clear to the
dfrct that all courts will honor an assignment to a subrog-atccl insurance company of a part of a cause of action
11risi11g from a tortious injury, and that, therefore, the
snhrogation clause in question was valid. The court said
that if au irnmred and an insurance company wish to
enter into an agreement, whereby the insurance company is subrogated to said medical payments, it is impr!ssible to see why this is an unfair or an improper re~nlt, aucl if this can be done with reference to property
(lamagc paymeuts, which the courts of Ohio construe as
~pl it ting a cause of action, it certainly can be done for
ill<'(lical payments, which likewise is splitting a cause
uf action.

The court further observed that the superintendent
of i11<.;11ra11('e of the State of Ohio has full authority to
<ll'n~· a claim to any companies ,vi10 fail to comply with
hi.~ orders and that there was no claim on the part of
1!1c rld<•ndant that the superintendent had intervened or
Li b'11 any action to pren'nt the type of policy set forth
'" 1d;1i11tiff's petition. Normally, said the court, parties
11

are free to contract as they desire, and the court can see
nothing against public policy in holding that medical
payments can be matters of subrogation as well as prop
erty damage payments.
In another Ohio case Travelers Indemnity Co. r.
Godfrey (1967), 230 N.E. 2d 560, the plaintiff insurer
brought an action against defendant for property darn.
ages and medical expenses which it claimed to have paid
growing out of an automobile accident in which defendi
ant was alleged to have been negligent in the operation ·
of his automobile, which negligence resulted in a collisi011
with an automobile owned by the insured, one Smith. In
one cause of action the plaintiff sought to recover for
medical expenses paid to the Smiths for injuries received
by the daughter, a passenger in the car, and in another
cause of action sought to recover for medical expensr1
paid to a Mr. and Mrs. Sciarini, parents of another minor
in the same vehicle. In its petition, plaintiff claimed
that under its policy of insurance and by assignment of
the parties involved it became subrogated to the rights
of its insured to such hospital and medical expenses.
There was evidence that the Sciarini girl had brought a
separate action against defendant tort feasor and that
this action had been settled and dismissed.
Overruling defendant's demurrer, the court said
that the present doctrine in Ohio and other jurisdictions seemed to be that a subroga.ted insurance company
is entitled to sue in its own name for the part of a claim
for damages arising out of an accident which has been
assigned to it under a subrogation agreement, and that
12

this is tme whether it is a subrogated right for property
damage or for hospital and medical expenses.
The court also said that Smith, if he had not made
<111 assignment of his rights to the plaintiff, would have
a separate cause of action against the defendant for propPrty damage to his automobile and for medical expenses
whieh he was obligated to pay for his minor daughter,
independent of other claims, and that 1~fr. and Mrs. Sciarini, likewise, would have a cause of action against the
rlef endant for medical expenses which they were obligated to pay for their minor daughter, independent of
~aid minor daughter's claim for personal injury, and that
the settlement of the daughter's claim could not affect
their right to rec8ver for such expenses.
Although recognizing that a claim for personal injnries is not assignable, the courts in some cases have
taken the view that the medical payments subrogation
clause did not constitute an assignment of a claim for
penwnal injuries, but merely impressed a lien upon the
proceeds of any recovery obtained by the insured from
the tort feasor. In De Cespedes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Cu., (Fla., 1966), 193 So.2d 224, affirmed, 202 So.2d
j61, plaintiffs whose automobile was involved in an accident with another automobile owned and operated by a
third party tort f easor, not a party to the present action,
arlmitted to having settled their claims against said tort
f<'nsor, and to having executed releases, and in the presPut action sought to recover a second time for their medi1'<il expenses under the medical payments provision of
thPir automobile insurance policy. That policy con-
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tainecl a subrogation clause that "in the event of am
payment under this policy, the company slrnll be ~uJ,
rogate<l to all the insured 's rights to recO\'ery therefor,
against any person or organization and the insured shall
execute and deliver instruments and papers ancl do "·hai
ever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such right:;,"
(Same as State F'arm Mutual 's policy.)
Affirming the trial court, which had granted a summary judgment for the defendant, the court held that ai1
insured was not entitled to a recovery under the me<licai
provision of an automobile poliey containing the abore
subrogation clause after he had settled his claim again>t
a third-party tort feasor and executed a full release. 1'he
court rejected plaintiff's argument that the subrogatioll
clause amounted to an attempt to assign a claim for
personal injuries, such au assignment being invalid under the common law and not expressly sanctioned by
statute. The court said that the eoncept of subrogation
is distinct from that of a mere assignment, and that
subrogation is a creature of equity having for its purpose
the working out of an equitable adjustment between thr
parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt hy
the person who in equity and good conscinence ought
to pay it. Under the doctrine of subrogation, said tl1f'
court, the insurer is "substituted" by operation of lmr,
to the rights of the insured, whereas, by contrast, an assignment generally refers to or connotes a voluntary act
of "transferring" an interest. Subrogation serves to
limit the chance of double recovery or windfall to tlj('
insured, the court eontinued, and when exercised, teud~
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to plaC'e tlw primary liability upon the tort feasor, where
it lielc!ngs and, cm1cluded, the court, so long as subrogai io11, ns a pp lied to this medical pay provision, serves to
bar de. uh le recovery, it should he upheld.
'l1 1Jis was a Supreme Court decision of Florida. The
Jfo:1rid Appellate Courts in Florida in the case of Mary/a11rl Casualty Co. v. Plant, (Mar., 1968), C.C.H. Automohilt> Law Reporter on Insurance, Case No. 5864, at p.
/013 and Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Birch (Fla.,
1%7), 196 So.2d 482, 202 So. 2d 561, followed the decision
of the De Cespedes case.

In the case of Bernardini v. Home and Auto Insuru11cc ('o. (1965, Ill.), 212 N.E.2d 499, an action was filed
liy tlw automobile liability insureds to recover reasonable medical expenses incurred by them as a result of an
automobile collision. At the time of the collision, plaintiffs were covered Ly a policy of insurance issued by the
1kfemla11t which provided for the payment of all reasonable mPdical expenses incurred within one year from the
ilah, of an accident, and which also contained an express
medical subrogation clause and a clause requiring the
r·oo1wra ti on of the insured in re la ti on thereto. Plaintiffs
rlfrdpJ a settlement through the insurer of the thirdparty tort feasor and executed a general release in favor
of the tort f easor, whereupon defendant refused to pay
the· medical bills incurred by the plaintiff, claiming that
tlic· plaintiffs prejudiced the defendant's subrogation
rig-lits contained in the policy. The trial court rendered
in!lgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that the medi":tl t1ulirogatio11 clause was an assignment of a personal
15

tort and thus void as against public policy. Upon appcat
the court, reversing, sustained defendant's contentions
that the clause granted the well recognized right of 8 ub
rogation to recovery from a third party tort foasor of
payments made to reimburse the insured for me<lica!
expenses caused by the tort feasor, that the medicRI
subrogation clause in the insurance contract was not 311
assignment of a personal tort and that when the in.
sured executed the general release, in favor of the thir(]
party tort feasor, the insured was precluded from re.
covering from the insurance carrier, because he harl
prejudiced any and all rights which the carrier may han
had by virtue of the subrogation provision. Observing
that both parties to the controversy recognized that i11
Illinois causes of action for personal torts are not as·
signable, the court said that it, nevertheless, agreed with
the dofendant that in the instant case the record did not
show an assignment of a personal tort. The court sai1l
that subrogation operates only to secure contribution aml
indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole
claim, and in the instant case the medical subrogation
clause did not purport to transfer or assign the entire
claim of plaintiffs against the tort feasor, but rather im
pressed a lien in favor of the insurer, to the extent of ib
payment, upon any recovery obtained by plaintiffs from
the tort f easor, the court observing that suhrogation diil
not deprive the insured of the recovery for paiu a!lll
suffering.
Again in Illinois where a medical payments insurerl
settled his claim for personal injuries ·with the tort fea8or

aud executed a general release, and then brought an
action to recover medical payments from the insurer
nuder an automobile liability policy which contained a
clause that in the event of any medical payments the insurer would be subrogated to all the rights of recovery
which the insured person had against the tort feasor,
and provided further that the insured should do nothing
after loss to prejudice the insurer's rights, the court in
Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance
r'o. (Ill. 1965), 209 N.E.2d 876, affirming a judgment
\rhich granted defendant's motion for judgment on the
plea<liugs, rejected plaintiff's contention that the subrogation clause was void as against public policy because
it constituted an assignment of a personal tort and also
because it was against public policy to permit subrogation in a non-indemnity type of· insurance policy. The
court said that it was clear that the subrogation clause
of the policy did not constitute an assignment of a perWllal tort, observing that subrogation presupposes an
nf'tual payment and satisfaction of the debt or claim to
which the parties subrogated, although the remedy is
kept alive in equity for the benefit of the one who made
the payment under circumstances entitling him to contrihution or indemnity, while an assignment necessarily
contemplates the continued existence of the debt or claim
assigned. In the case at bar, said the court, the contract
1Jf iHsurance clearly looked to subrogation rather than
assignment of a tort; the insurance company would have
pairl the amount due the plaintiff, thus satisfying his
rlaim, and the insurer would then have sought contributiou from the tort feasor, who was ultimately liable. Con17

eluding, the court held that it was clear that tlw poli('y
in question was one of indemnity and that the amom 1t
to be paid under the contract would depend on the amonut
spent by the insured for the proper care of his injuries.
The subrogation provision of the policy involved i1 1
the Damhesel case is the same standard provisio11 <'OH·
tained in State Farm .l\Iutual Insurance Company's pol.
icy now before the court.
The Tennessee cases of Wilson v. Tennessee Farmn,
M11t11al Insurance Co. (1966), 411 S.W.2d 699, and TP11nessee Farmers Insura~ice Co. v. Rader, (1966), 410
S."\V.2d 177, folloY,Ted the same line of reasoning as th1· ',
Illinois decisions in holding that the medical subrogation
clause of an automobile liability policy which did not plll'port to assign or transfer the entire claim of the polir)
holder against the tort feasor but which merely secured
contribution and indemnity to the extent of the medical
payment made to the insured was valid ancl enforceahlr
and not contrary to the law prohibiting the assigllmrnt
of a personal injury claim.
Jn an action to recover under a m<'dical payment'
policy, where the e'Tidence showed that plaintiff insured
was injured, when her automobile collicfod with mwthcr.
that she settled her claim against the clrin'r of the otl1t·r
car and gave him a general release, mid that she then <kmam1ed $3,2GO.OO from defendant insurer for h0r mctli
cal expenses, but that defendant refused to ywy it 01
the ground that she had recovere<l the sum from tlH' tnrl
feasor and had destroyed th<:> right of subrogation r1·
1
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sen·cd to defendant by the policy, the court in Bush v.
]{0111c Jusurance Co. (1967, N. J.), 234 A.2d 250, affirming a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant,
rejcckd plaintiff's contention that to allow medical payme11ts subrogation violates the principle against assigning· a personal injury claim, and violates a principle
against splitting a cause of action. The court said that
an as:-;ignment is a transfer by action of the transferor
whereas subrogation is an equitable right which arises
out of the facts and which entitles the subrogee to collect
that ~which he has advanced. The court also said the
plain1 iff 's contention that permitting subrogation for
medical payments may cause many practical difficulties,
rspccially where payment is made by the insurer and
then the insured makes, or seeks to make, a compromise
settlement with the tort feasor, could be answered (1)
By pointing out that no such difficulty existed here and
(~) By observing that the question of whether a provision for subrogation should not be permitted in a policy
hcranse it is impractical or unfair is for the commissionl'l' of banking and insurance to decide.

In Miller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
(1965, N. Y.), 264 N. Y. Supp.2d 319, plaintiff brought
n rleclaratory judgment action to declare invalid the
"subrogation" portion of his automobile insurance policy
as it applied to medical payments and to declare invalid
two trusts receipts exacted of him by the defendant, his
insurance carrier, as a condition of his claim for medil'al expenses. There was evidence that the automobile
liuhility insurance policy in question contained a medical
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payments clause which provided that in the event of any
payment the company would be subrogated to all the
rights of recovery therefor which the injured person may
have against any person causing the injury. The plain ,
tiff incurred medical expenses as a result of injuries
sustained in an automobile accident and thereafter exe
cuted trust receipts to the defendant after being told
that his claim would not be paid unless he did so. Plaintiff subsequently brought an action for personal iujurie~ '
against the tort feasor, which was afterward settled. DP- I
fendant claimed a lien for the medical expenses paid to
plaintiff by it and notified the tort feasor 's insurance
carrier of its claim, but that carrier chose to ignore th~
claim and paid plaintiff the full settlement. Granting a
judgment for defendant, the court declared: ( 1) The 1
subrogation provision in question was not an assignment
of all or a part of a claim for personal injuries; (2) The
subrogation provision created an equitable lien by subrogation against any recovery by the assured from a third
party; (3) The trust receipts in question were valid anrl
proper and under the terms of the policy their exaetioll
by the insurer as a condition to the payment of the claim
to plaintiff for medical expenses was not improper, invalid, or illegal; and ( 4) The trust receipts ·were Yalid
and made plaintiff a trustee only to the extent that he
received any proceeds of that portion of his claim arising
out of medical expenses for which he had received reimbursement from the insurer.
1

I
I

I

In an action to recover medical payments under au
automobile liability policy, where the evidence showed
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tlrnt plaintiffs had brought suit against the driver of the
other automobile involved in the accident and that settlemc11t was reached and both were paid in settlement of
their claims, and that although defendant insurer was
duly notified of the accident and of the fact that both
plaintiffs were injured and would present their claims
under the medical payment plan, the defendant insisted
that it would not pay until the necessary subrogation in'trnments were executed as provided for in the policy,
the court in Demery v. Na#onal Union. Fire Insurance
('o. (1967, Pa.) 232 A.2d 21 affirming a judgment on the
pleadings for the defendant insurer, held that the subrogation clause and the policy here in question was valid
ancl enforceable and that plaintiff had by their own act
made it impossible for them to comply with its terms,
and that thus, the plaintiffs being unable to execute the
subrogation agreement, judgment must be entered
against them and in favor of the defendant. The court
reYicwed a number of cases which had considered the
question as to the validity of such subrogation provisions
of medical payment clauses, and said that it believed that
the better reasoning was contained in the cases in which
the f'mbrogation clause was held to be valid, and that a
more equitable result would be reached if it followed
this reasoning, the court stating that the reasoning in
more modern decisions made a clear distinction between
an assignment of a tort claim and subrogation of medical
payments under a contract.
In the North Carolina case of Anderson v. Allstate
Insurance Co. (1966), 145 S.E.2d 845, the Allstate Insurance Company issued its automobile policy providing
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medical payments coverage subject to a limit of $2,000.00
to Anderson. rrhe National Grange 1\1 utual Insuranci·
Company issued its automobile policy providing medical
payments coverage subject to a limit of $1,000.00 to Bernett, and providing that National would be subrog-ated
to all rights of recovery which the injured person might
have against others. The Allstate policy had no suci
subrogation provision but provided that its medical pay.
ments coverage with respect to a non-o-wned automobile
was excess of other valid and collectible medical pay- .
ments insurance.
1

Anderson was riding as a passenger in Bernett'.'
automobile when it collided with a vehicle driven h1
Graham, whose negligence caused the collision. Anderson was fatally injured and the funeral expenses were
$1,373.25. Anderson's widow, as administratrix of his
estate, settled the claim against Graham and then brought
action against the Allstate Insurance Company to re
cover the funeral expenses under the medical payment>
coverage of the Allstate policy. The Allstate Insnrancc
Company, contending that its coverage was excess of the
Nation's policy, filed a cross-action against National. ~a
tional Insurance Company denied coverage because of
the release given to Graham which clefoatPcl National's
subrogation rights. The trial court held that, at the tirnl'
of the accideut, the National 's policy provi(led medical
payments coverage and that the Allstate's policy ·was rxcess, so that Allstate was liable only for the amount of
the funeral expenses in excess of $1,000.00. The atlministra trix appealed from the judgment to that effect.
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The Supreme Court found no error holding (1) That
' whc1 her 1he National policy provided "other valid and
rollectihle insurance" must be determined as of the time
of the collision and (2) That the destruction of her claim
ag-ai11st National by the administratrix in releasing the
ncgli~e11t driver did not enlarge her rights against Allstate.
In the case of Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe,
(:"llich. 19;}4), 64 N.W.2d 713, the plaintiff insurance company furnished the defendant insured certificate holders with medical and surgical service under the terms of
a certificate which contained an express subrogation
clause which provided that the subscriber and his dependents should eY-ecute and deliver such assignments of
claim or other papers as might be necessary to secure
plaintiff's right against the tort feasor. The court held
such clause binding on the subscriber and his dependents who accepted benefits under the certificate, the reconl containing no suggestion that the agreement was
i11uuced hy mistake, overreaching, fraud, or misrepresentation, and there being no ambiguity between the subrogation clause and the other terms of the certificate,
the court said it couldn't agree with the defendant's
contention that such clause gave the plaintiff no rights,
because to do so would be to read it out of the agreemtnt by rendering it meaningless, which a court may
not do. As against further contentions of the defendant,
the court stated that enrichment of the plaintiff is not
unjust if pursuant to the express agreement of the partiPs fairly and honestly arrived at before hand, nor is
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it unjust, unfair, or inequitable to give effect to an agretment which was not induced by mistake, overreaching,
fraud, or misrepresentation.
In Na.tional Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Grimei
(Minn., Sept., 1967), 153 N.vV.2d 152, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that an insured under the stand.
ard provisions of an automobile insurance policy prr
taining to medical pay insurance was liable to his insurance company for the amount it had paid to him under
the medical pay provisions of the policy after he executed a general release in favor of the tort feasor's insurance carrier who paid him the sum of $3,500.00 in .
exchange for a general release releasing all claims he had
against the tort f easor.
In the case of Associated Hospital Services, Inc., v.
Milwaukee Auto Insurance Company, (Wisc., 1967), 14i
N.W.2d 225, an action was filed by the insured to recowr
medical payments made to its insured follovving an accident. The action was against the liability insurer of the
tort f easor. The court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff's medical insurer against the defendant liability insurer which was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was eutitled to subrogation rights under the contract of insurance. In this
case the plaintiff was a non-profit organization, Blur
Cross. The defendant had settled with plaintiff's insurPd
for all claims and taken a general release. The plaintiff
sued the defendant insurance company and obtained a
judgment.
24

In summary, it is clear that the great weight of authority among the various states which have had the
~uestion presented to them has held the right of
subrogation to be valid and enforceable either on the
hasis that a personal injury action is assignable or that a
subrogation provision does not constitute an assignment
of a personal injury action but only a right of agreemrnt and indemnity which has been approved by the
hanking and insurance commissioner and that there is
nothing with respect to public policy that should make
the agreement invalid or unenforceable.
Other cases have pointed out that the insurance commissioner approved the provisions for subrogation and
that it is presumed that in approving the policy the commissioner has also taken into consideration the fact that
the reduced premium may be authorized by reason of the
subrogation provisions of the policy. Other courts have
stated that subrogation is an equitable right which arises
out of the facts and entitles the subrogee to collect that
which he has advanced, and the question of whether a
provision for subrogation should or should not be permitted in a policy because impractical or unfair is for
the commissioner of banking and insurance to decide.
In one case it was stated that subrogation is merely
a creature of equity to forestall a windfall for the wrongrloer where the insured has obtained and paid for the
expense of procuring insurance for his protection and
at the same time serves to limit the chance of double reco\'ery or windfall to the insured. When exercised, it
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tends to place the pnmary liability on the tort
where it belongs.

feaRrii

Our state statute contemplates the principle of sub
rogation insofar as insurance companies are conrernr·rl.
and we, therefore, submit that in consideration of all tbr
principles involved subrogation should be Yalid anrl 011 .
forceable.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT COl\11\fIT ERROR n
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF STATE FARJI
HAD GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE TO DE
FENDANT F ARl\IERS OF ITS SUBROG.\.
TION INTEREST PRIOR TO DEFFJNDANT'S
SETTLEMENT WITH THE INSURED SESSIONS.
The trial court, as a matter of fad, in its findings o!
fact and conclusions of law found that notice had hm
given to the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, of
plaintiff's subrogation interest prior to the time settle
ment was made between Farmers Insurance Excha11~ 1 •
and the State Farm Mutual insured, Carl R. Sessio11R and
that Farmers had receiYecl such notice. The followiut
facts supported the trial court's conclusion in that fl'·
gard: (1) The letter of August 4, putting Farmers ln·
surauce Exchange on notice of the subrogation interc~I
of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. rrhis notice
·was both as to medical pay and property damage suhro
ga tion. ( 2) Farmers Insurance Exchange then "'ent onl
and settled the claim of State Farm Mutual 's insnrrd i1I 1'

1
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took a general release. (3) Thereafter they paid the
property damage subrogation claim of State Farm Mut1rnl 's without objection or complaint about lack of notice
hut with respect to the medical pay subrogation claim
merely denied it on the ground that it was not a recoverable item under the laws of the State of Utah. They
ncwr did diHpute notice until the time of the summary
judgment. The notice with respect to medical pay and
property damage was all given at the same time, and if
they had notice of the property damage claim when they
discm;sed the matter of settlement with State Farm Mutual 's insured, then certainly they had notice of the medical pay claim and could have discussed that with him,
also. (4) The question of notice was raised at the time
of the argument on defendant's motion to dismiss bel'ause plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of
nction 1 and plaintiff's counsel thereafter furnished copil'~ of the letters to defendant's counsel and he apparently made contact with his company and thereafter wrote
a letter to the court stating that the matter of notice was
no 1011grr an issue.
The letters in evidence plus the admitted conduct of
the def en<lant, Farmers InP-urance Exchange, therefore,
r:o11clusively established that they had notice of the actual
payment of the medical bills as well as the property damagr claim at the time they went out and made their settlrment. The insured of State Farm Mutual had also
hePJ1 sent a letter notifying him of State Farm's subrogation claim and it appears clear to this writer that the
dt·fp11daut had actual notice of the subrogation interest
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of State Farm Mutual on both medical pay and the prop
erty damage claim at the time settlement was made.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment granted by the trial couri
sustaining subrogation contracts in the state of Utan
for medical payments should be sustained and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

L. L. SUMl\IERHA YS of
STRONG & HANNI

604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for\Respondent

28

1

